The emerging trend of using mobile agents for mobile adhoc network (MANET) 
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays mobile agent seems to be a popular choice for designing applicationslike service discovery, network discovery, automatic network reconfiguration etc. for resource constrained environments like mobile adhoc networks (MANET).Many a time task processing is taken up by mobile agents that roam in the network and consequently get the task done.
But securing agents is a big concern particularly when the underlying network typically undergoes continuous topology changes thereby disrupting flow of information over the existing paths.As has been pointed out in [1] security of a mobile agent paradigm emphasizes on protecting and preventing a mobile agent from malicious hosts' attacks by applying cryptographic functions. Unfortunately these countermeasures become insufficientwhen the environment itself brings with it much vulnerability like blackhole [2] , grayhole [2] or wormhole [2] attack. Commonly used routing protocols [2] cannot prevent such attacks. In such cases, the agents are either engulfed by a host (blackhole) or is forwarded elsewhere(wormhole). But in either case the agents will never be able to come back to its owner in due time.Thus an agent if happens to pass through such a host will effectively be lost.
Howeverpreventing a mobile agent from visiting a malicious node solves most of the risk factors. Consequently this technique not only protects the agents but also its owner that is the nodes in MANET. This point onwards, the terms node and host are used interchangeably unless otherwise stated.
Our threat model is as follows. We assume that the adversary can place malicious (wormhole/blackhole/grayhole) nodes at arbitraryplaces in the network, and that these nodes are connectedthrough a communication channel that cannot be observed by othernodes. These nodes either kill or mislead the agents in such a way that they (agents) never come back to their owners in time (within a specified time-out limit). The agents (by using a combination of hashcode and digital signature (as in [3] ))can successfully detect any attempt of changing its code upon reaching at a host site. Thus the attacker does not need to know details of above mentioned techniques to fool the nodes to believe that their agents are lost due to adverse MANET conditions.We assume agents are deployed by some distributed applications like service discovery or clustering etc where graceful degradation in performance (as some nodes may become malicious) is acceptable. If an agent needs to visit a particular node in MANET (as in e-commerce) and that node is corrupted then obviously the task cannot be completed in our model, even.
To enforce, we use the concept of trust that has received considerable attention in information security literature. In a way, trust and security are two sides of the same coin, because if a system is secure, it is trusted, and if it istrusted, then it must be secure and vice-versa [4] .
This observation leads us to consider security as a property of asystem in a given environment, and trust as a subjective belief resulting fromassessing a system and its environment. As in [1] we define trust as a subjective quantified predictor of the expected future behaviour of a trustee according to a specific agreement elicited from theoutcomes of the previous interactions, both from direct experiences and indirect experiences. Reputation of an individual host refers to certain characteristics related to its trustworthiness. Reputation can be obtained from a set of interaction feedbacks, in a mobile agent system; wheremobile agents describe a visited host's performance in fulfilling its obligations. Indirect experiences can also be considered which is gathered from other trustworthy nodes in the neighbourhood. To speed up convergence, the list of suspicious nodes may be shared among the nodes in MANET via the agents.
In this paper we describe a trust based framework for mobile agent based system in a dynamic and hostile MANET environment. We show how cooperative behaviour of the agents and nodes help to secure MANET and prevent an agent from getting trapped into a suspicious neighbourhood.Thus our definition of trust may range from complete belief to complete disbelief to full uncertainty as well as is described in section 3. This section also describes the basis of different types of observations done by the agents and consequently the nodes.
The next section(section 4) illustrates the way we model mobile agents on MANET in order to detect a malicious agent as well as a malicious platform (depending on trust level defined later) in a distributed way (using the reputation system designed in section 3).Section 5 gives the experimental resultsto show the robustness of our schemefollowed by concluding remarks (in section 6). In the following section (2), state of the art regarding this area of research is elaborated.
RELATED WORKS
This section summarizes the literature related to trust management schemes in MANETs and mobile agent based systems.
Trust Management in MANET
Trust-based data routing has been extensively studied inwireless networks including MANETs [5] [6] [7] [8] . The basic framework of a Trust Management System (TMS) includes a Reputation System (RS)and a Watchdog. Generally, the RS consists of reputationupdating through direct observation of the Watchdog (that is,first-hand information), reputation integration based on theindirect information from other members (i.e., second-handinformation), and reputation aging. The watchdogs normally monitor the event of data forwarding and count the arrival of ACKs corresponding to data sent out/forwarded. To cope with mobility, in [6] multiple feedbacks are compressed together. But using mobile agents for this purpose (which can already be deployed for functions like service discovery, clustering MANET etc.) will yield far better results as mobile agents are designed in such a way that they can easily cope with frequent disconnections and limited bandwidth characterizing MANET especially delay tolerant networks [6] . In [5] it is shown that mobility reduces uncertainty in trust calculation as it increases the chance of directly interacting with a node.
Trust in Mobile Agent Based Systems
Trust management system for mobile agents is also well studied [1] in literature. In [9] a distributed reputation management model is proposed that is based on Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. This system solves some of the problems in e -bay's reputation model taking deceptive ratings into account. A trust model is described in [10] for multi-agent systems (MAS) that considers information collected from several sources (interaction trust, witness reputation, role based trust and certified reputation). It also usesDempster-Shafer theory of evidence. In [11] , a mobile agent based reputation management system has been proposed for ebusiness environments. The system uses direct interactions and feedback from customers in a social network using agents, where each customer models trustworthiness of a vendor. The modelling of trustworthiness is done using Dempster -Shafer evidential theory, fuzzy logic. But this model does not fit into a resource constrained dynamic environment like MANET. In [1] , a reputation-based trust model is proposed for mobile agents. Bayesian Network based trust computing is used and two algorithms are proposed for strategically malicious trustee prevention.
But most of these works are not focused on MANET and so the effect of dynamic topology changes, noisy environments, and more importantly mobility, are not considered in these works. Thus, securing mobile agents and nodes in MANET by using the notion of trust is a comparatively new research paradigm. More importantly, assumption of a trusted third party or a trusted server and with 100% availability is practically not feasible in MANET. So the approaches based on a fully trusted node renders useless in resource constrained dynamic environments like MANET.
Although some works have been done to detect blackholeattack [12] or even wormhole attack [13] in MANET but we did not come across any work that studies its effect on agents in MANET or uses the agents to detect such traps.
TRUST MODEL
A reputation system [14] represents a promising method for fostering trust amongcomplete strangers and for helping each individual to adjust or update its degree oftrust towards its corresponding interaction partner and thereby reduce uncertainty.But a reputation system also suffers from threats like strategic rater [15] or strategically malicious host [14] . We attempt to address these threats by taking opinions from the agents and peers.
The main focus of our work is to study and prevent the nodes and agents (deployed by them) in a MANETfrom the effect of network layer attacks like blackhole [2] or wormhole [2] in which the affected agents do not come back to their owner.
Due to the inherent distributed nature of MANET nodes can only have imperfect knowledge about others. Thus it is impossible to know with certainty whether a host is malicious or not; but we can only have an opinion about it, which translates into degrees of belief (how much trustworthy a host is) or disbelief (how much suspected a host is) as well as uncertainty in case both belief and disbelief are lacking. We express this mathematically [4] as:
b+d+u=1
(1) Here b, d, u designate belief, disbelief and uncertainty respectively.
The design of our reputation system is shown in figure 1 . It focuses on how to exploit the collected information to quantify the reputation of a node to ensure that an agent never falls into a blackhole, grayhole [2] or even wormhole trap. In addition, digital signature may be used to prevent or at least detect any attempt to change static code of the agent [16] . To quantify trust, parameters (b, d and u) are updated from direct observations (agent's experience at different nodes) and indirect observations (feedback from neighbouring nodes and others, collected via agents). Both observations are combined towards quantifying trust from (b, d and u). Aging is also considered in the process that accounts for network dynamicity.
Direct Observation
As mentioned in [16] Here application code of agent refers to the purpose for which it is deployed by its owner. The signature helps to authenticate the code and checks trustworthiness of the host. The dynamic code part will be meaningful for strong migration [17] which is uncommon in MANET. In the end, every agent shares its experience with the owner. Thus we assume that an agent eventually finds its owner whenever it needs. Here we take Beta(α,β) distribution as in [5] [16] .α ij represents the number of good transactions between the agents deployed by owner i and node j . Thus for each positive feedback from agents, α ij is incremented as follows:
Here p j k represents agent k 's observation about node j . In this case weighted average is taken, where ω (0<ω<1) represents the absolute trust on each agent's observation as this observation may change from time to time taking care of network dynamicity.
Moreover, it may so happen that an agent successfully visits a number of hosts before falling into a trap. So, every node maintains last L owner ids that sent agents to this node. Thus if agent k while visiting node j finds its owner id in L (indicating some agent from the same owner has recently visited this node) then it further increments p j k in equation2 accordingly.
An agent may not come back to its owner in time (time-out) due to network latency or presence of wormhole or blackhole. But to detect the exact cause, the owner divides the task into n subtasks (value of n depends on network bandwidth) and deploys n agents. These agents are expected to come back faster and reveal more information about the network. Now if anagent k does not come back, the owner i increments β ij as follows
Here j represents all nodes that the part agent k needs to visit in order to complete the subtask given to it. But β ij may not reflect the exact scenario as a node can be strategically malicious [14] . Thus there is an uncertainty associated with the agent's observation. To deal with such issue, an approach proposed in [5] , leveraging on the Dempster-Shafer Belief Theory [18] is adopted here to quantify the uncertainty of some random variables.
Thus the uncertainty in predicting the nature of node j by node i is [6] [3]:
An agent while visiting a host site may also share and update its suspected list with the host. Any appended entry to the list will be considered as indirect observation at the agent owner. This is done to prevent a node from having any deceptive information.
The values of α ij and β ij are fed to the reputation system that maps these to a tuple (b ij , d ij , u ij ). Here b ij gives node i 's belief in node j 's behavior as safe host site for agents deployed by node i . Similarly d ij indicates node i 's disbelief and u ij reflects node i 's uncertainty of predicting node j as a safe host site for its agents. Here u ij is calculated using equation 4. Consequently following equation 1, the total certainty (= (1-u ij )) is divided into b ij and d ij according to their proportion of supporting evidence as follows (initial observation is based on [5] ):
Averaging (weighted) is needed to reflect n part agents' behavior in the same tuple (b ij , d ij , u ij ).New observation is given a weight of ω 1 and old observation is given a weight of ω 2 .Thus old values of b ij and d ij are given lesser weights(ω 2 < ω 1 ) than recent values to represent aging.
In this way with the help of Dempster-Shafer Belief Theory [18] uncertainty can significantly be reduced even though perfect accuracy could not be achieved.
Indirect Observation
For faster convergence of trust, nodes share information about suspicious node/samong each other via the agents. A node is suspected if its b<u<d. This information indirectly influences a node's view of the network. The influence is indirect as an agent suspects a node based on another (preferably trusted) node's observation without ever visiting that node.This secondhand information helps a node to cope with long delays and frequent partitions (formation of disconnected clusters) which are characteristics of MANET. It can be noted that node i 's disbelief in node j 's observation becomes an uncertainty for predicting node l [3] . Also node i 's uncertainty on node j amounts to the uncertainty of node i in predicting node l 's future behavior.
If node i enters a new network and gets trapped by its very neighbours then no agents deployed will come back. Then node i will prefer to wait till it moves. Moreover if a significant number of agents do not come back indicating wormhole or blackhole trap in transit, node i will prefer to request and collect information about suspicious nodes from its trusted neighborhood. Here b i:l represents the indirect belief of node i about node k . S denotes the set of nodes that shared its view of the network (that node i received) with the agents deployed by node i in the last time interval.
Combining Direct and Indirect Observation
After collecting first-hand and second-hand information from the agents/trusted neighborhood, a node attempts to integrate them all to come to a unified conclusion about future behavior of the nodes. Here γ (0<γ<1) indicates a node's confidence on the agents it deployed. Larger values of γ (>0.5) means a node tends to trust its agents whereas smaller values (<0.5) indicates that a node tends to trustothers' recommendations. Now, trust can be quantified from the comprehensive belief, disbelief and uncertainty as [4] [6]
Here σ gives relative atomicity based on the principle of indifference [3] . We have taken σ to be 0.5 indicating that among the total uncertainty associated with an agent's visit, there is a 50% probability that the agent will be safe. But we can tune this parameter more accurately meaning, that for higher values of disbelief, there is a possibility that σ<0.5 and vice versa.
Consequently, depending on the trust values calculated from equation (18) and the safety requirement of the applications (running at the nodes) that deploys agents, an owner decides an agent's task route or asks it to avoid suspicious host sites.
IMPLEMENTING OUR MODEL ON MANET
In this paper, we define our mobile agent-based system (S) to be consisting of M independent agents deployed by k owners that may move in the underlying MANET. To describe our model we will take help of the abstraction of an ad hoc network as in [16] . The nodes move according to Smooth Random Mobility Model [16] and two ray propagation [17] of radio signals is assumed while checking for link existence. Here we try to protect mobile agents from visiting malicious hosts (nodes) and to prevent trusted nodes from sending agents to malicious ones. We assume the compromised nodes can send malicious agents to mislead a node about its trust level. Also a compromised node may work as a black hole tovisitoragents.
In this scenario we can think of a mobile agent as a token visiting one node to another in the network (if the nodes are connected) based on some strategy as needed by the underlying applications to accomplish its task.
An important use of mobile agents is to collect data from a network like service discovery [19] or clustering in MANET [20] or ecommerce applications [21] , etc. An agent starts its journey from a given owner and moves from one node to another at its will. The owner provides a Priority List to the agent which contains a list of node ids that are most beneficial migration sites (for the application that deployed that particular agent). A Suspicious Node List is also given that indicates potential blackhole or wormhole points.Reachinga trusted site an agent shares and updates its knowledge about suspicious nodes. So, an agent will always try to visit nodes from (Priority List-updated Suspicious Node List) set. But this movement is successful if the two nodes are connected according to equation (24) and there is no simultaneous transmission in the neighborhood of the intended destination (taken care of by the MAC protocol). Thus, an agent residing at node MN A moves to node MN B (connected to MN A ) with probability p t .
We describe the security model as follows.
Detailed Algorithm
The following data structures are needed The workflow can be divided into two parts: (i) Computation/Action in mobile node and (ii) functions of the agents.
Algorithm I describesthe function of the agents collecting first handinformation about an agent's trust and second hand information about the nodes whom the hosts (visited by the agent) suspect.
Algorithm II , an evolutionary algorithm based on Monte Carlo simulation, is running at the nodes that takes its input from algorithm I and any message received from trusted neighbors (second hand information) to update the distributed trust model and hence the node's trust level view of the network. This in turn affects the route taken by newer agents.
Steps followed by each agent 3.1. If any new entry is found in the suspected node list then 3.1.1. Update this information depending on how much the owner trusts the information provider according to equations 7 through 12 4. Kill the agent (Algorithm -I, steps 1.4 and 1.5) 5. Return
Step 1.3 of algorithm-I is optional, it isneeded to protect the priority list (kept as part of agent's data) from corruption. Individual node failures are considered in step 2.1 of MN_code(). But we did not consider the fault tolerance of the nodes. Here a node failure is treated to be irrecoverable. It may be pointed out that step 1.4 of Agent_code() actually corresponds to step 2.4 of MN_code(). Here we assume that a host eventually detects a malicious agent. Creation of part agents will be continued unless all of them come back or decision can be made about the nodes found in the priority lists of missing agents.
As can be seen, agents in our system migrate and collect feedback about the trustworthiness of the nodes they visit. So, they work like watchdogs [6] . The reputation system at the nodes based on the first hand and second hand information updates its view of the network and accordingly guides (providing priority list and suspected node list) the agents it deploys.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The simulation is carried out in Java and can run in any platform. For simplicity, in our simulation the PL tells the agents which nodes to visit. After visiting all the nodes from the PL =0.91906)of its owner's (MN 1 ) trust view. This process goes on. While updating direct observation in equation 5 and 6, for simplicity (major change is not expected in simulation time=80min) old and new values are given equal weights. As soon as trust view of any node goes below 0.49, that node is declared to be malicious and is appended in the suspected list of agents (removed from its PL as well) spawned by the detector node. Thus the nodes try to overcome routing attacks without any overhead of control messages.
We have done a series of experiments to validate our algorithm and found some interesting results. For simplicity whenever an agent goes missing, 2 agents are spawned as is explained in the example. The simulation parameters are summarized in table-I.Any change to it is explicitly mentioned. We introduce a metric called the ratio of agents attracted during time period t that is defined as follows
்௧.௧௦ௗ௬ௗ௧௧௧ (19) Experiments are done to show timely variation of this metric while the MANET has 3 malicious nodes (MN 3 figure 3 clearly show that agents gradually overcome network hostility. This is evident from the steady slope of the curve especially after T=8min. As number of malicious nodes increases more agents are affected but eventually the agents detect them by the trust calculation. Since the curve well stabilizes at around 80 min with 3 malicious nodes, simulation time is kept at 80min in our experiments.
Also we show variation of the ratio (equation 19) with no. of nodes (N) in figure 4 while MN 3 and MN 4 launch blackhole/wormhole attack.It can be observed that as the network gets bigger, the ratio gradually declines (due to increased amount of indirect observation) and eventually (N=35 onwards) reaches a steady state.Also more number of agents (M=20) implies richer direct observation resulting in even faster convergence of trust. Arrival of steady state for both M=10 and 20 indicates the scalability of our scheme with moderate accuracy.
Another metric named ratio of successful agents is defined as follows
்௧.௧௦ௗ௬ௗ௧௧௧ (20) All agents deployed by an owner may not come back within stipulated time as some of them may be rerouted by malicious nodes (wormhole), engulfed by them (blackhole) or lost due to network partitioning. Agent code/data may get modified also that can be detected by the owner (by generating and checking hashcode [16] ). Considering MN 3 The dependence of successful detection and subsequent deletion of malicious nodes from PL by any node on the number of agents they deploy is indicated in figure 6 . It is seen that with 50 agents, up to 3 malicious nodes can be successfully detected within 80 minutes and no nodes in that case will be sending their agents to MN 3 , MN 4 or MN 5 . Also it can be observed that all curves reach a local maxima when number of agents is approximately equal to number of nodes (=25). This is because at this point all nodes get the direct observation from agents, that is, agents tend to cover the entire network.
In the next experiment our model is tested with increasing MAS size. We define a metric called ratio of false negatives that is defined as follows: 
Let us presume we know the total number of malicious nodes in the network at a time instant. So it is checked if our algorithm running at the nodes can successfully detect all the malicious nodes. The results show(figure 7) that as more nodes participate for some job and hence deploy agents (which in turn also gains direct experience) to traverse various parts of the network more malicious nodes are eventually detected. Thus for greater MAS size the ratio ultimately drops to 0 indicating successful detection of all malicious nodes. For bigger network more agents are needed to achieve the same value of false negatives hence needing more bandwidth. Interestingly with M=2*N, the ratio of false negative hits 0. It also portrays correctness of our algorithm as all malicious nodes can be detected by deploying sufficient no. of agents.
CONCLUSION
This paper provides a trust based framework for securing the hosts and preventing the agents from visiting or passing through a compromised node specially a blackhole/wormhole trap (from where the agents won't make a successful return in time) in MANET. Possible modification in data is detected by taking hash code of an agent's data and code. Our model establishes trust among the nodes in a totally distributed manner without any central coordinator (for example a trusted third party). If an agent does not come back, new agents with smaller PLs are spawned to get better visibility of the MANET. Perfect detection of malicious nodes relies on how minutely the owners divide the PL of missing agents (and give it to new agents). Direct observations of the agents that come back play a very important role in the detection process. If any node is found to be malicious, its entry gets removed from the PL and appended in the suspected list of agents that are further deployed. The scheme enables an agent to share information with others about suspicious nodes, thus helping in faster convergence of trust. Hence nodes visited by an agent can know about MANET hostilities without deploying agents. Trust is quantified using a tuple (b,d,u). For faster convergence of trust (consistent (b,d,u)s), newer nodes may ask for indirect information from trusted neighborhood. SRMM is used to simulate the movement of the nodes. The protocol is validated and results are shown in section 5. It can be observed that according to our scheme even for larger MANET, nodes can detect all the malicious nodes and eventually prevent themselves and their agents from network hostilities. 
